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Abstract  
During the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), Portugal was in a 
unique position, both geographically and politically, compared to 
other European powers. With a 1200 kilometre border shared 
exclusively with Spain and a young authoritarian political regime, 
which had established Portugal as a corporatist state in 1933, the 
Portuguese could not ignore the civil war on their doorstep. 
Regarded as the ‘poor relation’ of Europe, and viewed as the 
inferior partner in the historical Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, an 
anxious Portugal was suddenly elevated into a central position on 
the European political stage when Britain and France pressured 
the European powers into non-intervention during the Spanish 
conflict. This article will show that the Estado Novo government, 
led by Prime Minister António de Oliveira Salazar, followed a 
course of action in support of a Nationalist–controlled Spain under 
General Francisco Franco. It will be argued that this response was 
influenced by Salazar’s personal principles in order to protect 
Portuguese sovereignty and interests from the threat of communism 
and atheism, which Salazar associated with the Spanish Republic. 
This article has been peer reviewed 
 
The Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) caused widespread 
concern across continental Europe in the 1930s. European powers, 
such as France and Britain, held fears of a pan-European war 
beginning in Spain and spreading across the continent. No country 
was in quite the same state of anxiety as Portugal, Spain’s Iberian 
neighbour, whose sovereignty was threatened by the hostilities 
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across the border.
1
 Despite their fears, the Portuguese government 
was able to steer Portugal through the crisis so that the nation 
emerged intact following the Spanish war. During this time, 
Portugal was governed by the Salazar regime, a right-wing 
dictatorship that held power from 1926 to 1974, and took its name 
from Dr. António de Oliveira Salazar, the Prime Minister of 
Portugal and leader of the regime.
2
  
This article will present a brief discussion of the history of 
Portugal to demonstrate the political and social setting in which the 
Portuguese responses to the Spanish Civil War were made. These 
responses will be examined to determine how and why the Salazar 
regime was able to successfully lead the nation through the 
uncertain times of the Spanish Civil War. The nature of the 
Portuguese response to the war will be shown to stem from the 
personal principles of the Portuguese Prime Minister, Salazar, 
which included his devotion to the Catholic faith, his commitment 
to a traditional social order in Portugal, his passionate defence of 
Portugal’s sovereignty and his intense fear of communism.3 
 
An important series of events involving Portugal, at an 
international level, was the Salazar regime’s reactions to the 
policies of non-intervention, which were proposed by the British 
                                                 
1
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1941, Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 1994, pp. 7-15. 
2
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military dissidents in the opposition to Salazar, 1941 – 1974, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1988, pp. 1-2. The regime suppressed numerous 
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through the Second World War. Salazar died in 1970, but the regime continued 
until 1974. 
3
 Charles E. Nowell, Portugal, The Modern Nations in Historical Perspective 
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and French governments at the outbreak of the Spanish conflict. 
This paper will outline the significant events regarding Portugal’s 
role in the Non-Intervention Committee (NIC) and its breaches of 
the Non-Intervention Agreement (NIA).
4
 Some attention will also 
be given to the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, which strongly 
influenced Portugal’s association with non-intervention during the 
Spanish Civil War.
5
 
This article will examine the assistance that the Salazar 
regime provided to the Spanish Nationalist forces, led by General 
Francisco Franco, in order to prevent a Spanish Republican victory. 
It will be argued that Portuguese resistance towards the Salazar 
regime, and the contribution of Portuguese soldiers to both sides of 
the war, indicated that Portuguese society had divided political 
opinions, despite the Estado Novo’s suppressive methods of 
maintaining social and political order in Portugal.
6
 To conclude, 
this article will briefly discuss the nature of, and reasons behind, 
Salazar’s decisions regarding the Spanish Civil War, and the 
position of Portugal at the end of the conflict. 
An independent Portugal gradually emerged from its 
position as a feudal dependency of the kingdom of Léon in the 
twelfth century. Since this time, Portugal’s independence has been 
precarious. Threats and invasions by foreign tribes, empires and 
European powers had endangered the sovereignty of Portugal for 
nearly eight hundred years. Following the decline of the powerful, 
medieval Portuguese Empire over time, the imperial ambitions of 
other European powers had also endangered Portugal’s colonial 
                                                 
4
 It is impossible to examine all of the events regarding non-intervention in this 
article. 
5
 Stone, The Oldest Ally, pp. 1-2, 6. 
6
 For clarification, the Spanish Nationalists, that are referred to in this paper, can 
also be  known as ‘fascists’, ‘rebels’, ‘Francoists’ and ‘insurgents’ in other 
sources; Nowell, Portugal, p. 159. 
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holdings. By the late nineteenth century, the interest in Africa, 
shown by other European states, forced Portugal to ‘safeguard’ its 
colonies at the expense of progress and development at home. 
Portugal suffered from economic and social hardships, and had 
fallen behind other nations in matters such as education, health, 
economics and the military.
7
 Since medieval times, Portuguese 
leadership has had various political arrangements, including 
absolute monarchies and a Republic with a ‘limited monarchy’ 
from 1910 until 1926, which preceded the Salazar regime.
8
 
The First World War (1914-1918) was a turning point in 
modern European history. The social and economic misery caused 
by the war resulted in ‘ideological mobilisation and political 
militancy’ across Europe. The civil unrest and mobilisation of the 
‘political masses’ accompanied demands for alternative political 
systems to replace the traditional forms of government that were 
blamed by many, for the suffering in, what seemed to be an 
illogical war.
 9
 These alternative systems included liberal 
democracy, socialism or fascism, depending on the ideologies and 
circumstances of the dissidents.
10
  
The great, autocratic empires of Tsarist Russia, Ottoman 
Turkey, Hohenzollern Germany and Austria-Hungary, were 
divided by social conflict during the Great War and faltered as they 
failed to meet the industrial, social and economic demands that 
                                                 
7
 Nowell, Portugal, pp. xi, 1-4, 24-25, 117-124, 128. Various monarchs and 
officials of Portugal had been offended when treated as representatives of the 
‘poor cousin’ of Europe while promoting their country’s interests abroad. 
8
 Nowell, Portugal, pp. xi, 1-2, 62, 79-86, 126-134. 
9
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were required to meet the challenge of ‘total war’.11 The Russian 
Revolution of 1917 was a watershed moment in the war as left-
wing political parties across Europe began to assert themselves and 
hoped that revolution would bring peace; in the case of Russia, a 
provisional democratic government overthrew the Tsarist 
autocracy, before the Bolsheviks established a Communist system 
of government, based on Marxist theory, following a civil war. 
Further Communist agitation occurred in many cities of Europe, 
where Communist Party members organised strikes, 
demonstrations and factory occupations, as social resentments and 
the revolutionary atmosphere increased after the end of the war in 
1918.
 12
 
The collapse of the great empires also saw an increase in 
parliamentary democracies across Europe after the First World 
War. For some of the democracies, the liberal climate proved to be 
brief, as the Communist threat that emerged from the Russian 
Revolution cast a westward shadow over the European continent in 
the 1920s. Democratic values were cast aside as the fear of 
communism grew, and the hardships of the Great Depression set in 
from 1929.  A new political trend developed as many European 
governments shifted towards the right, leaving the ‘northern 
                                                 
11
 Paxton and Hessler, Europe in the Twentieth Century, p. 84. Paxton and 
Hessler describe ‘total war’ as the mobilisation of the population to produce 
military equipment and supplies at the expense of regulated civilian 
consumption.; agriculture and industry are organised to maintain the production 
of supplies; governments allocate labour towards war production and away from 
traditional places of work, and public opinion is directed towards the support of 
the war effort. Although they were severely affected by the First World War, it 
was Britain and France who were the most successful European states to meet 
the challenge of total war. 
12
 Mazower, Dark Continent, pp. 10-14. Mazower contends that Hungary was 
the only other country where Bolsheviks were able to seize power, although their 
time in power lasted for only a few months during 1919; Paxton and Hessler, 
Europe in the Twentieth Century, pp. 108, 121, 131-133. 
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fringes’ of Europe as home to some of the only nations with 
parliamentary democracy intact in the 1930s.
 13
  
Portugal was amongst the continental nations where 
attempts at democracy had failed. The Portuguese Republic, which 
emerged in 1910, was plagued by political and financial 
instability.
14
 Unlike Spain, Portugal was unable to remain neutral 
during the First World War after pressure from her British ally and 
increasing anti-German feeling in the country. An unprepared 
Portugal reluctantly entered the war on the side of the Allied forces 
from February 1916. As with other European nations, the war 
expenditure brought financial hardship and shortages, which, 
together with the loss of life, provoked social tensions within an 
already politically unstable Portugal.
15
 The growing opposition to 
the weak and ineffective government gathered force in the army 
and amongst academics at Coimbra University.
16
 Eventually, 
Portuguese Army officers seized power in 1926.  By 1928, 
Portuguese academic, Dr. António de Oliveira Salazar, had 
                                                 
13
 Mazower, Dark Continent, pp. 3-5. Mazower states that before the First World 
War, there had been three European republics, but by the end of 1918 the number 
of republics in Europe had risen to thirteen; Paxton and Hessler, Europe in the 
Twentieth Century, pp. 90, 108. 
14
 Mazower, Dark Continent, pp. 4-5; Paxton and Hessler, Europe in the 
Twentieth Century, p. 225. 
15
 Nowell, Portugal, pp. 137-139. Some ‘skirmishes’ between Portuguese and 
German troops took place along the borders of the Portuguese colonies of 
Angola and Mozambique (which were adjacent to the German territories in 
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war; Richard Robinson, Contemporary Portugal: A History, London: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1979, pp. 138-139; Romero, ‘Spain and the First World War’, 
pp. 32, 47-48. Romero contends that Spain became isolated and was ‘scorned’ by 
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Spain. 
16
 Paxton and Hessler, Europe in the Twentieth Century, p. 225. The Portuguese 
experienced fifteen elections during the sixteen years of the Portuguese 
Republic. 
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emerged as the dictator of the new regime, and was believed to the 
only leader who could resolve Portugal’s financial problems due to 
his specialisation in the field of economics.
17
 The objective of 
Salazar’s authoritarian Estado Novo regime, officially installed in 
1933, was to provide the Portuguese people with political, social 
and economic stability, guided by the principles of the Catholic 
Church. Salazar’s policies were constructed to maintain a 
hierarchical Portuguese society where every person knew their 
place in a defined social order.
18
   
Salazar spurned the position of Portuguese president, 
leaving this task to army generals, but performed his role as the 
dictator of the regime through his position as the Portuguese prime 
minister from 1932 to 1968. He also acted as Portugal’s foreign 
minister from1936 to 1947 in the years of the Spanish Civil War 
and the Second World War.
19
 American historian Charles Nowell, 
contends that the constitution was manipulated to give Salazar 
supreme power as a dictator in Portugal.
20
 This can be seen in 1933 
when the newly revised constitution designated Portugal as the 
Estado Novo (New State): a corporative and authoritarian 
government, which replaced the rights of the individual with 
organisations that represented the interests of the people. Individual 
powers were adjusted, political parties were outlawed and the size 
                                                 
17
 Nowell, Portugal, pp. 143-145; Paxton and Hessler, Europe in the Twentieth 
Century, pp. 225, 305. Salazar was a conservative economist; he strived to 
balance Portugal’s budget and retain social order through spending cuts, 
monetary policies to reduce inflation, and repayments of the national debt. 
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 Nowell, Portugal, pp. 150-154; Paxton and Hessler, Europe in the Twentieth 
Century, p. 305; Raby, Fascism and resistance in Portugal, p. 3. 
19
 Paxton and Hessler, Europe in the Twentieth Century, p. 305; Richard 
Robinson, Contemporary Portugal: A History, London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1979, p. 85. 
20
 Nowell, Portugal, pp. 157-158; Paxton and Hessler, Europe in the Twentieth 
Century, p. 305. 
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and capacity of the parliament was greatly reduced.
21
 Changes to 
industrial relations meant that no strikes or independent unions 
were permitted, with national guilds replacing the suppressed 
unions.
22
 The Portuguese population was also controlled using a 
system of suppression, which included the use of political police 
and censorship.
23
  
Portuguese independence was to be threatened by the 
political events unfolding in neighbouring Spain in the 1930s.
24
 
With the election of the Spanish Republic in 1931, the Estado Novo 
feared that revolution and communism would spread to Portugal, 
despite the relative weakness of communism in Spain at the time 
compared to later years.
25
 The small Partido Comunista de España 
(PCE) used the April 1931 election as an opportunity to promote 
the Communist cause in Spain. Although they understood that their 
low membership meant that electoral victories were unlikely, the 
results were still disappointing for the PCE, who received only 
60,000 votes throughout Spain. However, the coming of democracy 
under the Second Republic allowed the PCE to work openly in 
order to gain a higher profile in Spanish politics.
26
 In December 
1930, PCE membership had stood at around 1500 members, 
                                                 
21
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22
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 Stone, The Oldest Ally, p. 7. 
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nd
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26
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whereas by mid-1931, the numbers had risen to over 7000.
27
 By 
1936, the PCE had some 40,000 members and saw sixteen 
Communist representatives elected as part of the Popular Front in 
the February 1936 election. The party strengthened further during 
the civil war; eventually, the Communist Party became the 
strongest and most influential political party in the Spanish 
Republic, which was largely due to the influence of the Communist 
International and the Soviet Union.
28
 
Salazar viewed the political events in Spain, following the 
election of the Popular Front Government in February 1936, as a 
forerunner to revolution, and had been critical of the inability of the 
Spanish Republic to prevent social unrest in Spain.
29
 On 17 July 
1936, Spanish generals began a powerful military insurrection 
against the Spanish Republican government, which started the 
Spanish Civil War.
30
 Salazar believed that the restoration of 
Spanish law and order by the Nationalists would be the better 
option for ensuring the political and social stability of Portugal.
31
 
The Estado Novo strongly believed that victory for the Spanish 
Republican forces would ultimately result in a Communist 
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Portugal, deprived of its independence and its colonies. The 
support given to the Spanish Republican forces by the Soviets 
heightened these anxieties; in the decade prior to the civil war, 
Portuguese concerns had been raised by the rise of the Soviet 
Union. Salazar was also worried that the Portuguese working class 
would fall under the influence of the Spanish left and threaten the 
social order in Portugal. The fears of the regime grew further with 
rumours of Spanish Republican plans to absorb Portugal into a 
Spanish-Soviet Republic in the form of a federation of Iberian 
states. The imprisoned, future Spanish Republican Prime Minister, 
Largo Caballero had expressed his commitment to this scheme in 
an interview with the American journalist, Edward Knoblaugh, in 
1935.
32
 British scholar, Michael Alpert, states that: ‘When the 
Spanish Communist newspaper Mundo Obrero actually forecast a 
joint Iberian Popular Front, Salazar’s fears were confirmed’.33 
Conversely, the Portuguese authorities were aware that 
Portugal’s independence could still be under threat in the event of a 
Nationalist victory if Spain’s past imperial ambitions were revived 
under Franco. Accounts of Nationalist plans to make Portugal a 
Spanish province, as well as rumours of plans to return to the 
‘glory days’ of Phillip II of Spain, who had annexed Portugal in 
1580, made the Portuguese uneasy about the Spanish Nationalist’s 
future intentions towards them. Despite these concerns, Salazar still 
believed that a Nationalist Spain would be the preferred means of 
                                                 
32
 Alpert, A New International History of the Spanish Civil War, pp. 53, 200. 
Largo Caballero was the Spanish Republican Prime Minister from 5 September 
1936 to 17 May 1937; Review of Edward H. Knoblaugh, An American 
Journalist in Madrid: Correspondent in Spain, Sheed and Ward, 1938 pp.233. 
7s. 6d’. The Tablet 8 January 1938, pp. 15-16, Web, Available: 
http://archive.thetablet.co.uk/article/8th-january-1938/15/an-american-journalist-
in-madrid-correspondent-in-  (4 December 2014); Stone, The Oldest Ally, pp. 7, 
12-14.  
33
 Alpert, A New International History of the Spanish Civil War, p. 53. 
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maintaining social and political stability in Portugal, and continued 
with his plans to assist the Nationalists.
34
  
In the 1930s, most Portuguese people were Catholic. During 
the years of the Portuguese Republic, from 1910 until 1926, the 
Catholic Church in Portugal had suffered from persecution and was 
disestablished by the Republican leaders.
35
 Salazar was a pious 
Catholic who had, at one time, studied for the priesthood. His 
religious convictions were to play an important role in the direction 
that the Portuguese response to the Spanish Civil War would take.
36
 
His devoutly Catholic regime was hostile to the idea of a secular, 
and possibly atheist, society that the threat of communism might 
bring to Portugal. Salazar was alarmed at reports of the acts of 
vandalism and desecration that were directed against the Catholic 
Church in the Spanish Republic, and was further resolved to assist 
the Nationalists whom he viewed as Portugal’s ‘co-religionists’ in 
Spain.
37
  
At the outbreak of the war, Portugal became the Spanish 
Nationalist’s first international ally.38 On 1 August 1936, Salazar 
publicly declared that the Portuguese government would assist the 
Nationalists by any means necessary.
39
 Salazar initially provided 
them with medical equipment, radios and some ammunition; the 
Portuguese also refuelled Spanish Nationalist seaplanes that were 
on their way from northern Spain to join Franco in the Straits of 
                                                 
34
 Stone, The Oldest Ally, pp. 12-14. 
35
 Nowell, Portugal, pp. 7-8. 
36
 Tom Gallagher, Portugal: A twentieth-century interpretation, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1983, p. 86; Nowell, Portugal, pp. 150-151, 155. 
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37
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38
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39
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Gibraltar.
40
 The military aid that Salazar was able to give the 
Nationalists was small, but he offered alternative means of support, 
which proved to be valuable.  The Nationalists were able to 
establish the ‘black embassy’ in a Lisbon hotel; this was an office 
where propaganda, communication, financial assistance, arms and 
military supplies for the war were organised by Franco’s brother, 
Nicolás, and the leader of the Confederación Española de 
Derechas Autónomas (CEDA), the Spanish Catholic Party, José 
Maria Gil Robles.
41
 Pro-Spanish Republican political groups who 
attempted to assemble in Lisbon were suppressed by the 
Portuguese authorities.
42
 The government also encouraged 
Portuguese radio stations to exploit the new medium of radio to 
manufacture propaganda during the Spanish Civil War, and 
allowed the Portuguese print media to publish pro-Nationalist 
articles and commentary. These forms of propaganda were valuable 
ways in which Spanish Nationalist ideologies could be broadcast 
across the Iberian Peninsula.
43
   
In the early weeks of the civil war, foreign observers soon 
noted the assistance that Portugal was providing to the Spanish 
Nationalists. German and Nationalist officials conferred in Lisbon 
over the supply of arms, while the arrival of German ships 
transporting armaments for the Nationalists was taking place in 
                                                 
40
 Alpert, A New International History of the Spanish Civil War, p. 54. 
41
 Stone, The Oldest Ally, p. 9; Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, p. 346.  
42
 Judith Keene, Fighting for Franco: International Volunteers in Nationalist 
Spain during the Spanish Civil War, London: Hambledon Continuum, 2001, p. 8. 
43
 Nelson Riberio, ‘Using a new medium for propaganda: The role of trans-
border broadcasts during the Spanish Civil War’, Media, War & Conflict, vol 7, 
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Portuguese ports. The Nationalists, officially commanded by 
Franco from 21 September 1936, following the death of General 
José Sanjurjo in a plane crash in Portugal on 20 July 1936, were 
also assisted by the fascist regimes in Germany and Italy.
44
 As 
Portugal was not equipped to supply Franco with the kinds of 
military weaponry that was required to win the civil war, German 
and Italian-supplied arms were crucial in boosting Franco’s 
military arsenal.
45
 
The Spanish Republicans received aid from the Soviet 
Union, but had also hoped for support from other Western 
democracies, such as Britain and France. The British resisted these 
requests for military aid as they wished to confine the war to Spain 
and maintain a friendly relationship with the victors of the struggle. 
A French proposal of non-intervention by European powers was 
accepted by the British in the early weeks of the conflict, and was 
considered to be the best way to preserve British strategic and 
commercial interests in their territories in the Mediterranean and 
the Eastern Atlantic Ocean.
46
  
The initial French proposal for non-intervention involved an 
agreement between France, Britain and Italy. Britain disapproved 
of this first proposal and sought to include the immediate 
                                                 
44
 Preston, Franco: A Biography, pp. 177-179; Robinson, Contemporary 
Portugal, p. 86. The Portuguese government had allowed the exiled Spaniard, 
General José Sanjurjo, to create a base for military conspirators, who opposed 
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France. 
45
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46
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participation of Germany, Russia and Portugal. To the chagrin of 
Britain, ‘lowly Portugal’ now occupied a central position of power 
in European diplomacy. The policy of non-intervention 
contradicted the preferred Portuguese reaction to the Spanish 
conflict, which was to assist Franco and the Nationalists. Portugal 
hesitated as the government sought assurances of British protection 
in the event of a threat to Portuguese security. Portugal requested 
certain conditions: to monitor the use of Tangier as a supply base 
by Spanish Republican warships, an equal commitment to non-
intervention by the Soviet Union and the right to respond to any 
aggression towards Portugal by Spanish military forces. The British 
offered support to the Portuguese regarding the situation in Tangier 
and the Soviet commitment, but were less reassuring about the 
assistance that they would give Portugal in the event of any 
Spanish aggression. They argued that the non-intervention of 
Portugal alongside other European powers would negate an attack 
from Spain.
47
  
The different positions of Britain and Portugal regarding 
non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War strained the historical 
Anglo-Portuguese Alliance in the early months of the conflict, as 
the Portuguese continued to demonstrate a clear preference for a 
Nationalist victory, and frustrated the British and French by 
delaying their signing of the NIA.
48
 The British informed the 
Salazar regime that continuing to delay would jeopardise any 
request for assistance in the event of Spanish aggression against 
Portugal. During this period of procrastination, there were reports 
of food and other supplies reaching the Nationalist forces in Spain, 
                                                 
47
 Stone, The Oldest Ally, pp. 2, 8, 17n, 17-18. 
48
 Nowell, Portugal, pp. 32-33. An alliance between Portugal and England began 
in the fourteenth century with King Fernando’s support of John of Gaunt’s claim 
to the Castilian throne through marriage. John of Gaunt was the son of Edward 
III of England; Stone, The Oldest Ally, pp. 8, 19. 
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via Portugal, as the Portuguese government continued to provide 
assistance to the Nationalists.
49
 
On 13 August 1936, Portugal reluctantly agreed to non-
intervention, but on condition that its border was not threatened by 
the war and with the understanding that Portugal’s commitment to 
the agreement would depend upon the interests and judgements of 
the Portuguese.
50
 Britain also pressured the Portuguese into serving 
on the NIC, which was to be established in London in September 
1936.  Portugal gave a public display of adhesion to non-
intervention by refusing access to Portuguese ports by a German 
ship, but was soon committing breaches after signing the NIA. 
German ships, bound for Portugal, were observed loading military 
supplies that were destined for Spain.
51
 On 20 August 1936, the 
German Minister in Lisbon reported that Salazar had enabled the 
smooth transition of German war materials to Spain from two 
German steamships.
52
 On 22 August 1936, the German Chargé 
d’Affaires in Lisbon informed Berlin that, despite its appearance of 
neutrality, the Portuguese were committed to supporting the 
Nationalists. The Spanish Republican politician, Julio Alvarez del 
Vayo, reported that the Republican’s deteriorating situation in the 
                                                 
49
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50
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war, in late August 1936, was largely due to the foreign assistance 
given to the Nationalists.
 53
   
The day after Portugal agreed to support the NIA, the 
Spanish border city of Badajoz was taken by the rebel forces.
54
 The 
Spanish Republican Foreign Minister, Julio Alvarez del Vayo, 
reported that the capture of Badajoz was partly due to the 
cooperation of the Portuguese frontier authorities who allowed 
lorries laden with ammunitions to pass through Portuguese ports, as 
well as handing over escaped Spanish Republicans to the 
Nationalists.
55
 Jay Allen, of The Chicago Tribune, was a foreign 
journalist who reported on the massacres at Badajoz. Allen’s article 
reports on Portugal’s role in the Spanish Civil War and events in 
Spain along the Portuguese border. Allen stated that since the fall 
of Badajoz on August 14, 1936: 
 
Thousands of republican, socialist and communist 
militiamen and militiawomen were butchered after the fall 
of Badajoz for the crime of defending their republic against 
the onslaught of the generals and the landowners.
56
 
 
Allen also wrote:  
But blackest of all: The Portuguese “international police” 
in defiance of international usage, are turning back scores 
and hundreds of republican refugees to certain death by 
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rebel firing squads...The day before, the mayor of Badajoz, 
Madronero, and the socialist deputy, Niceleu de Pablo, 
were handed over to the rebels. On Tuesday, 40 republican 
refugees were escorted to the Spanish frontier. Thirty-two 
were shot the next morning. Four hundred men, women 
and children were taken by cavalry escorts through the 
frontier post of Cala to the Spanish lines. Of these, close to 
300 were executed.
57
 
Allen recorded his conversation with a Portuguese official: 
‘A talkative frontier policeman said: “Of course we are handing 
them back. They are dangerous for us. We can’t have Reds in 
Portugal at such a moment”’.  When Allen questioned him about 
the handing over of so many Republican refugees to the Spanish 
Nationalists, the policeman replied: ‘It’s being done all up and 
down the frontier on orders of Lisbon’. 58 
In The Oldest Ally: Britain and the Portuguese Connection, 
1936-1941 (1994), British historian, Glyn Stone, contends that the 
Portuguese authorities allowed, and encouraged, Franco’s police 
and intelligence agents to operate within Portugal.
59
 This access 
through the borders of Portugal gave the Nationalists a strong 
strategic advantage.
60
 Nationalist officers were permitted to enter 
Portugal as they wished, but Republican militants, who crossed the 
border from Spain, were treated very differently by the Portuguese 
police. As Allen’s report demonstrated, these captured soldiers 
were returned to Nationalist-controlled Spain and were frequently 
murdered by the Nationalists.
61
 Recent investigations in Portugal 
have determined that many villagers from Portuguese border towns 
aided the Spanish Republican refugees who had escaped across the 
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‘750-mile border with Spain’. Some Republican Spaniards were 
hidden from the Portuguese police by the villagers in order to 
prevent their deportation back to Spain. Witnesses to the events 
have indicated that, for the most part, help was given to the Spanish 
refugees by Portuguese villagers, regardless of their politics.
62
 
Soon after the events at Badajoz, the Portuguese published a 
‘decree of prohibition and note of adhesion’ for the NIA on 27 
August 1936, after sustained pressure from the British and French 
governments. It was agreed within the British foreign office that an 
understanding of the difficulties faced by Portugal must be taken 
into account.
63
 This was expressed by Horace Seymour of the 
British Foreign Office: 
 
In general, is there not perhaps some excuse, or at any 
rate some explanation if the Portuguese have not behaved 
in the last six weeks with entire wisdom? It is one thing to 
look at these events from London: it is quite another to be 
in the position of a small country, with a large land frontier 
to Spain.
64
  
The first article of the Portuguese decree was that arms 
should not be transported to Spain through Portugal. The second 
article excused Portugal’s obligations if it was determined that the 
enlistment of volunteers or the raising of funds for the Spanish was 
proved to be taking place within the participating countries of the 
NIA. The third article stipulated that non-intervention was effective 
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immediately by the British, French, German, Soviet and Italian 
governments.
65
  
Prior to the publishing of Portugal’s decree, foreign 
newspapers continued to report that military supplies for the 
Spanish Nationalist forces were being unloaded in Lisbon. The 
British dismissed these reports on the grounds that the adherence of 
other European powers to non-intervention would influence the 
Portuguese to end these activities, and that Portugal, itself, could 
not offer a significant supply of arms to Spain. Accusations of 
breaches of the NIA were also levelled at Portugal, Italy and 
Germany by the Spanish Republican government in September and 
October of 1936. It was proposed by the British that random 
investigations on the Spanish-Portuguese frontier should check for 
breaches of non-intervention, while the Soviets requested that the 
British and French navies should assume control of Portuguese 
ports.
66
  
Meanwhile, interesting events in Portugal strengthened the 
Salazar regime’s commitment to Franco, and further weakened 
their commitment to the NIA.
67
 The Portuguese Communist Party 
had become more influential amongst the working class from the 
mid-1930s, and became increasingly active in the resistance to the 
authoritarian Estado Novo. Their influence became obvious when 
they were able to infiltrate the Portuguese armed forces. In early 
September 1936, they initiated the attempts of the Revolutionary 
Organisation of the Navy to commandeer three Portuguese 
warships in the Tagus River in support of the Spanish Republic.
68
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The crews of the warships imprisoned the officers and planned to 
sail the vessels to the Mediterranean in order to join the Republican 
forces in Spain.
69
 Newspaper reports from London, on 6 September 
1936, declared that ‘complete calm had been restored’ in Lisbon 
and that: ‘Shore batteries killed six and wounded nine of the 
mutineers…’70  Five days later, further media reports from London 
indicated that revolts had also taken place in Portuguese Army 
garrisons. These reports were denied by the Portuguese embassy in 
London who commented that: 
 
In view of the territorial importance of Portugal...those 
desiring anarchy to reign in the country have naturally 
redoubled their efforts to aid the Spanish Reds. Portugal 
has been attacked and insulted by the foreign Press…and 
the Government, therefore, has been obliged to intensify its 
offensive against Communism.
71
 
 
The mutinies demonstrated that not all political opinions in 
Portugal, regarding the Spanish war or otherwise, were in 
agreement with that of the Salazar regime. The Portuguese Foreign 
Minister, Armindo Monteiro, related to the British Ambassador 
that: 
There were only 17,000 to 20,000 Communists in Lisbon 
(out of a population of some 700,000); but there were 
many Radicals of various sorts, whilst there was also much 
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poverty, so that there existed a favourable field for the 
subversive propaganda coming from Spain...[sic] 
72
 
 
The Estado Novo was forceful in its suppression of the 
mutiny, but feared further insurrections.
73
 Other acts of sabotage, 
committed by Spanish Republican sympathisers, included the 
damaging of supplies destined for the Nationalist forces in Spain, 
the ‘blowing up’ of the radio transmitter of the Rádio Clube 
Portugués in Parede and an unsuccessful assassination attempt on 
Salazar.
74
  
These incidents proved to Salazar that the internal security 
of Portugal was under threat and that the Estado Novo must 
strengthen their support of the Spanish Nationalists.
75
 The mutinies 
also reinforced Salazar’s belief that the Spanish Civil War was not 
confined to Spain, but was an international struggle where 
revolutionaries also plotted against the Portuguese government.  To 
counteract these threats, a Portuguese militia was assembled to 
combat any further danger from Republican Spain. This militia 
became the Portuguese Legion, which was officially founded on 30 
September 1936.
76
 At its peak, the Legion boasted 20,000 
members; many were sent as volunteers to fight for Franco, while 
those who remained in Portugal were occupied with defending their 
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country from the spread of communism.
77
 The numbers of these 
Portuguese ‘volunteers’ who fought with the Spanish Nationalist 
forces has been debated by historians.
78
 Nowell argues that Franco 
had indicated that the number of Portuguese fighting with his 
forces was: ‘several thousand’.79 Stone cites the figures given by 
the British representative with the Nationalist authorities, Sir 
Robert Hodgson, as consisting of up to 20,000 Portuguese 
volunteers, with around 8000 casualties.
80
 Australian historian, 
Judith Keene, writes that observers have found their exact numbers 
difficult to assess as the Portuguese soldiers wore no identifying 
insignia.
81
 Nowell states that some Portuguese men also fought 
with the Spanish Republican forces against the Nationalists.
82
 
As the war progressed, suspicions of Portugal’s breaches of 
the NIA continued. The sudden severing of formal diplomatic ties 
between the Portuguese and Spanish Republican governments on 
23 October 1936, once the Nationalists were in control of the 
Spanish-Portuguese border, exasperated the British government 
and complicated the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance further. 
Notwithstanding, a meeting of the NIC, on 28 October 1936, 
determined that there was insufficient proof of transgressions by 
the Portuguese, although the British government was forced to 
                                                 
77
 Gallagher, Portugal: A twentieth-century interpretation, pp. 85-86; Nowell, 
Portugal, p. 159. Portuguese military personnel and civil servants were required 
to swear oaths of allegiance to the Estado Novo and to renounce communism.  
78
 Keene, Fighting for Franco, p. 4. Keene states that the Portuguese troops were 
not volunteers in the ‘proper sense of the word’, and were present in Spain due to 
the support given to Franco by the Portuguese government.  
79
 Nowell, Portugal, p. 158.  
80
 Stone, The Oldest Ally, p. 11.  
81
 Keene, Fighting for Franco, pp. 7-8. The Spanish Foreign Legion recorded 
869 Portuguese recruits to their ranks. Keene indicates that Portuguese soldiers 
also served in the regular Spanish army, and in Carlist and Falangist militias. 
82
 Nowell, Portugal, p. 158.  
FJHP – Volume 30 – 2014 
133 
defend the Portuguese from the accusations of British Labour Party 
Members of Parliament and from objections raised by the Soviets.
83
 
In January 1937, the NIC agreed to install international 
observers on the non-Spanish side of Spain’s borders, and on ships 
that had departed non-intervention countries for Spain. The 
Portuguese government refused to allow international observers on 
its side of the frontier for security reasons, but did eventually agree 
to the presence of British observers working from the British 
Embassy in Lisbon. British naval ships were also permitted to 
patrol the Portuguese coast.
 84
 These naval patrols proved to be 
ineffective and were ultimately abandoned by Portugal, Italy and 
Germany following unsubstantiated reports of torpedo attacks on a 
German cruiser in June 1937. The British and the French were then 
left with the responsibility of these coastal patrols and naval 
inspections. Portugal used this incident as an opportune time to 
abandon all observation of their frontier with Spain, which led to 
the French government declaring that they saw no reason to 
maintain international control on their Pyrenees border with Spain 
if control of the Portuguese frontier had ceased. These 
developments exasperated the British government further.
85
 The 
British Ambassador to Portugal, Charles Wingfield, expressed 
these frustrations when he wrote to the British Foreign Minister in 
February 1937: 
But experience had shown us that we could not rely on 
promises of non-intervention by all the Powers represented 
on the committee. We all knew that armaments were going 
to Spain. And though no Power admitted that they were 
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sending them there, they certainly did not come from 
heaven...
86
 
Britain continued to maintain the policy of non-
intervention in Spain despite the often-flagrant breaches of the 
agreement by other European states, including Portugal.
87
 Debates 
within the British government, and with other foreign powers, 
failed to get effective frontier control or naval patrols operating 
again.
88
 In The Spanish Civil War (originally published in 1961)
89
 
Hugh Thomas states that discussions at the final NIC meetings 
were centred on plans to withdraw foreign volunteers who were 
fighting in Spain.
90
 From this point, Thomas indicates that even 
the British had grown weary of the failed concept of non-
intervention in the Spanish Civil War, and they began to 
‘overlook’ repeated breaches of the NIA by Portugal. This change 
in attitude, in late 1938, reflected the direction that the Spanish 
war was taking at this time, as well as British preoccupation over 
tensions brewing amongst the European powers in the lead up to 
the Second World War.
91
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By 1938, the outcome of the Spanish Civil War had 
become obvious, with a complete victory by Franco expected by 
most foreign observers. The Portuguese government chose to 
officially recognise Franco on 28 April 1938, and eventually 
persuaded the British to do the same in order to reduce the German 
and Italian influence in Spain. The British finally recognised the 
Franco regime on 27 February 1939.
92
 This coincided with a 
reaffirmation of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance; the British now 
realised that they could no longer assume that Portugal would 
comply with Britain’s demands as readily as they had done in the 
past. The British sent a military mission to Portugal to evaluate the 
urgent need for the rearmament of the Portuguese military and to 
assist with coastal defences due to the sudden German and Italian 
interest in Portugal.
93
  The Portuguese government had become 
wary of the German and Italian intervention on the side of the 
Spanish Nationalists during the civil war, and were concerned that 
the Axis powers would expect to maintain an influential presence 
throughout the Iberian Peninsula.
94
 Historian, Hugh Kay, claims 
that Salazar feared the consequences of a fascist Spain dominated 
by Germany as much as he feared those of a Republican Spain 
dominated by the Soviet Union.
 95
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In A New International History of the Spanish Civil War 
(2004), Michael Alpert indicates that: ‘The Non-Intervention 
Committee held its last meeting on 20 April 1939 to ‘wind up 
business’, and questions the achievements of non-intervention.96 
Alpert posits that in the early days of the war, the NIA had been 
simply a ‘face-saving device’ for the British and the French 
governments, and that non-intervention had probably achieved 
little more than ensuring the demise of the legal government of 
Spain. He argues that the weak responses of the Western 
democracies towards the Spanish Civil War led the European 
dictatorships to believe that they could behave as they pleased on 
other matters, and set the scene for the future political events that 
would culminate in the Second World War.
97
 
To determine the nature and reasons for the Portuguese 
responses to the Spanish Civil War, Hugh Kay, in Salazar and 
Modern Portugal (1970), points to the studies of the Portuguese 
Under-Secretary for War, Colonel Santos Costa, who examined 
the positions that the Salazar regime could have taken upon the 
outbreak of the Civil War in Spain.
98
 The first possibility open to 
Salazar was either inaction due to indifference, or collaboration 
with the Spanish Republican government and left wing 
organisations, including the Spanish Communists. These were 
impossible options to Salazar who, firstly, could not ignore a 
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bloody civil war on the Iberian Peninsula in the hope that it would 
have no effect on Portugal, and, secondly, feared being overrun by 
the Spanish Republicans as a precursor for an eventual Communist 
takeover of Portugal.
99
  
The second possibility for the Salazar regime was to 
support the Spanish Civil War as a process where Spain would be 
divided into small, separate states, which Kay identifies as 
‘Balkanization.’ As the war progressed, Basque and Catalonia 
used the conflict as an opportunity to reassert themselves as 
autonomous states and establish their own governments. Portugal 
was hesitant in showing support for these independence 
movements as Salazar regarded a divided Spain, and a 
‘Balkanised’ Iberian Peninsula, as yet another avenue for 
Communist expansion into Portugal.
100
   
The third possibility, which was the option chosen by 
Salazar, was to advocate for two strong, independent and allied 
Catholic nations on the Iberian Peninsula. Santos Costa referred to 
Salazar’s resolve to pursue this ‘policy of collaboration’ between 
Portugal and Spain as ‘one of the most brilliant phases of 
Portuguese diplomatic history’. It culminated in the Iberian Pact of 
1939, which the Portuguese signed with the Franco regime, and 
was a Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression between Portugal 
and Spain that was to strengthen the defence of the peninsula. The 
conditions of the treaty were mutual respect for each other’s 
borders and sovereignty, and the refusal of aid to other powers that 
threatened or attacked either nation. The new alliance between the 
Portuguese and the Spanish helped Portugal to remain neutral 
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during the Second World War, and allowed the Portuguese to 
concentrate its armed forces on the defence of its colonies.
 101
 
The end of the Spanish Civil War did not change the way 
that the Salazar regime ruled Portugal. Tom Gallagher states that: 
‘The repressive features of the Estado Novo that were introduced 
after 1936 took on institutional form and were retained even after 
the defeat of the major fascist powers at the end of World War 
II’.102 Political dissidents were imprisoned in harsh conditions in 
police custody, Portuguese gaols or the infamous Tarrafal prison 
camp in the Cape Verde Islands, although the numbers of political 
prisoners held in these institutions are estimated to be less than 
1000 over the course of forty years.
103
 
The eventual downfall of the Estado Novo regime finally 
came in 1974 when the Armed Forces Movement overthrew the 
government after more than forty years in power and following 
thirteen years of war in the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique, 
                                                 
101
 Kay, Salazar and Modern Portugal, pp. 87-89. The friendship between 
Portugal and Franco’s Spain assisted them in remaining neutral during the 
Second World War, and allowed Portugal to concentrate its armed forces on the 
defence of their colonies; Robinson, Contemporary Portugal, p. 87. 
102
 Gallagher, Portugal: A twentieth-century interpretation, p. 87. 
103
 Raby, Fascism and resistance in Portugal, pp. 2-4. Raby considers these 
numbers of political prisoners to be low compared to the numbers imprisoned 
by other contemporary fascist regimes. He believes that this leniency gives the 
impression that the Salazar regime was not fascist, which he claims has been the 
subject of much academic debate by observers of Portuguese affairs. Raby’s 
study of Portuguese fascism indicates that academic debate has argued against 
identifying the Salazar regime as fascist due to the non-flamboyant 
characteristics of Salazar compared to dictators such as Mussolini and Hitler, as 
well as the lack of organised propagandist rallies and marches that are often 
associated with fascist regimes. Raby refers to the ‘classic’ Marxist-Leninist 
definition of fascism, advanced at the VII Comintern Congress of 1935, as 
being only partially applicable to Portugal, where fascism is the ‘open terrorist 
dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic and most imperialist 
elements of finance capital’. 
FJHP – Volume 30 – 2014 
139 
Guinea and Angola.
104
 Nowell claims that most scholars agree that 
the Salazar regime offered Portugal more stability than many 
previous political arrangements.
105
 This opinion is shared by many 
modern Portuguese people, although the Salazar regime is 
remembered as oppressive and few traces of the former 
dictatorship remain visible in modern Portugal. Others prefer to 
shun the past and look to the future, despite Portugal’s recent 
struggles with corruption and the fact that it remains a poor 
country.
106
 
 
Glyn Stone states that it was ‘ideological fears and 
prejudices’ that prompted the Portuguese to assist the Spanish 
rebels during the Spanish Civil War.
107
 The Portuguese 
government was to make decisions and policies based on the 
dictator’s devout Catholicism, his distrust of democratic 
government, his hatred of communism, his preference for tradition 
over progress and his crusade to maintain the independence and 
sovereignty of Portugal.
108
 Salazar had been steadfast in believing 
that Portugal’s survival as a nation would stand a greater chance 
with a Nationalist victory in Spain, as he preferred the prospect of 
a political relationship with Franco rather than the Republican 
government. Stone believes that Salazar’s judgement was 
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vindicated in 1939 with the signing of the Iberian Pact with 
Franco.
109
  
Despite his flaws, Salazar is remembered by many 
Portuguese as the leader who provided security and a strong sense 
of national identity to Portugal. Salazar’s dedication to Portugal 
and his successful management of Portuguese affairs during the 
Spanish Civil War, and then the Second World War, has 
contributed to his revered status.
110
 However, the arguments 
presented here have shown that this national security and stability 
came at a price. The authoritarian regime imposed a system of 
oppression upon the population with the intention of controlling 
the social, political and religious order in Portugal.  Incidents of 
sabotage and resistance during the Spanish Civil War, such as the 
mutinies on Portuguese warships in support of the Spanish 
Republic, have demonstrated that political and social tensions 
existed within Portuguese society despite the appearance of a 
stable population.
111
 
The determination of Portugal to preserve its political and 
social independence meant that the country had been in dispute 
with Britain, which endangered the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance.
112
 
This article has shown that Portugal never approved of non-
intervention and, like Germany, Italy, the Soviet Union and even 
France, chose to support and provide aid to one side of the war.
113
 
It has been seen, here, that this aid was not significant in terms of 
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armaments and war materials; rather, it was the use of Portuguese 
ports to receive military supplies, the access across the Portuguese-
Spanish border and the opportunity for exiled Nationalists to 
establish offices in order to administer the war, which had 
provided important logistical advantages to the Spanish 
Nationalists during the war.
114
 
The support given to Franco by the Salazar regime 
indicated to Britain that the circumstances of the Portuguese had to 
be understood in their own Iberian context, and were not 
conditional to the desires of the British. Portugal had used the 
Spanish Civil War as an opportunity to remind the British that they 
could not expect ‘limitless obedience’ from their ally.115 Although 
the Salazar regime chose to support and aid the Spanish 
Nationalists, they remained wary of the possibility of Franco’s 
imperial ambitions towards them and the increasing influence of 
the Axis powers on the Iberian Peninsula. Despite these concerns, 
the threat of communism, which Salazar associated with the 
Spanish Republic, meant that the Portuguese authorities regarded a 
Nationalist Spain as the lesser danger to Portugal, and formulated 
their reactions, accordingly.
116
 It is clear that, ultimately, the 
Portuguese response to the Spanish Civil War was implemented 
based on decisions that were in the best interests of Portugal and 
the Salazar regime, and not of Franco, Spain or Britain. 
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